By Saree Makdisi
Republished from Los Angeles Times

In the months ahead, the state Senate Committee on Education will consider a bill that pretends to strike a blow for intellectual honesty, truth and freedom,
but in reality poses a profound threat to academic freedom in the United States.
Peddled under the benign name “An Academic Bill of Rights,” SB 5 is in fact part of a wide assault on universities, professors and teaching across the country.
Similar bills are pending in more than a dozen state legislatures and at the federal level, all calling for government intrusion into pedagogical matters,
such as text assignments and course syllabuses, that neither legislators nor bureaucrats are competent to address.
The language of the California bill — which was blocked in committee last week but will be reconsidered later in the legislative session — is extraordinarily disingenuous,
even Orwellian.
Declaring that “free inquiry and free speech are indispensable” in “the pursuit of truth,”
it argues that “intellectual independence means the protection of students from the imposition of any orthodoxy of a political, religious or ideological nature.”
Professors should “not take unfair advantage of their position of power over a student by indoctrinating him or her with the teacher’s own opinions…
before a student has had an opportunity fairly to examine other opinions upon the matters in question.”

To protect students from what one might (mistakenly) suppose to be an epidemic of indoctrination,
the bill mandates that students be graded on the basis of their “reasoned answers” rather than their political beliefs.
Reading lists should “respect the uncertainty and unsettled character of all human knowledge.”
Speakers brought to campus should “promote intellectual pluralism,” and faculty should eschew political, religious or “anti-religious” bias.
Notwithstanding its contorted syntax, the bill may sound reasonable.
But, in fact, it has nothing to do with balance and everything to do with promoting a neoconservative agenda.
For one thing, the proposed “safeguards” to “protect” students from faculty intimidation are already in place at all universities,
which have procedures to encourage students’ feedback and evaluate their grievances.
Despite a lot of noise from the right about liberal bias on campus, there are simply no meaningful data to suggest that any of these procedures have failed.
The real purpose of the bill, then, is not to provide students with “rights” but to institute state monitoring of universities,
to impose specific points of view on instructors — in many cases, points of view that have been intellectually discredited —
and ultimately to silence dissenting voices by punishing universities that protect them.

“Why should we, as fairly moderate to conservative legislators, continue to support universities
that turn out students who rail against the very policies their parents voted us in for?”
–asks the Republican sponsor of the Ohio version of the bill.

(because thats education-ASSHOLE!…citx)

Backers of the Florida bill would like to empower students to sue professors with whom they disagree on the theory of evolution.
The campaign for academic “rights” actually originated with organizations and individuals committed to defending Israel from criticism,
and whose interest in curtailing academic freedom dovetails with those of conservatives.
At the federal level, for example, a confluence of conservative and pro-Israeli forces helped push HR 3077 through the House of Representatives in 2003.
That bill, which foundered in a Senate committee (but has been resurrected in the current Congress),
called for government monitoring of international studies programs that receive federal funding.
The bill was drafted in response to the claim that the federal government was funding programs that criticize American foreign policy.

If passed, it would have created a board (including two members from “federal agencies that have national security responsibilities”)
to ensure that academic programs “better reflect the national needs related to homeland security.”

(WTF?..-citx)

Its supporters included the American Jewish Congress, the Anti-Defamation League, and the American Israel Political Action Committee,
the bulwark of Israel’s Washington lobby.
The bill was also backed by pro-Israel agitators Daniel Pipes and Martin Kramer, who, via allies such as neoconservative firebrand David Horowitz,
are among the proponents of the “bill of rights” legislation at the state level.
All the proposed bills before state legislatures are variants of a text written by Horowitz and backed by Students for Academic Freedom,
which maintains a website where students can complain about their instructors’ supposed bias.
The problem with all this is that the university is meant to be an insular environment.
Those within its walls are supposed to be protected from outside political pressures so that learning can take place.
But the lesson of the recent upheavals at Columbia University —
where an individual professor became the object of a concerted campaign of intimidation because of his criticisms of Israel —
is that pressure groups targeting an individual professor for his public views are willing to inflict collateral damage on an entire university.
What the new legislation offers such groups is the opportunity to inflict damage preemptively on our entire educational system.
Despite its narrow defeat in the California Senate Education Committee last week, SB 5’s supporters clearly will not disappear quietly.
If this and similar bills pass, who gets hired and what gets taught could be decided not according to academic and intellectual criteria
but by pressure groups, many of whose members are failed academics driven by crassly political motivations.

Society would pay the price.

(it ALREADY is…-citx)

By BRIAN CONCANNON, Jr.

Yvon Neptune’s last meal may have been on April 17. Haiti’s most recent constitutional Prime Minister, now its most prominent political prisoner, stopped eating eighteen days ago to protest ten months of illegal imprisonment. He is weak, emaciated and near death-his internal organs are failing. He has vowed not to eat until the Interim Government of Haiti (IGH) drops the charges against him; charges that it has refused to pursue. The IGH, coming under increasing pressure and looking for a compromise, offered to fly Neptune out of the country for medical treatment and exile last weekend. But the government would not drop the charges, so Neptune refused to leave.

The IGH has chosen a precarious place to take this stand. Neptune was arrested pursuant to a valid warrant last June 27 (he turned himself in when he heard about it on the radio), but since then the government has not taken even the first step in prosecuting the case against him. Although Haiti’s constitution requires that a judge confirm any detention within forty-eight hours, 155 forty-eight hour periods have elapsed without Neptune seeing the judge on his case.

There is scant evidence that the crime of which Mr. Neptune is accused, the so-called “La Scierie Massacre” even happened. The accusations arose out of violence in the provincial city of St. Marc in February, 2004, during a rebellion against Mr. Neptune’s government. On February 7, an armed anti-government group called RAMICOS took over the St. Marc police station. Two days later, police reinforcements reclaimed the station, and that afternoon the Prime Minister flew to the city to give a press conference and try to reassure the population. Two days after that, on February 11, RAMICOS clashed again with police and with members of Bale Wouze, a pro-government group, in the St. Marc neighborhood of La Scierie. By almost all accounts, a few people on both sides were killed. By many accounts the majority of deaths were on the RAMICOS side. No one has presented evidence that Mr. Neptune was involved with the clash in any way.

Two weeks later, Neptune’s boss, President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, had been kidnapped to the Central African Republic on a U.S. government jet, and American Marines controlled Haiti. Mr. Neptune stayed in office for a few days and cooperated with the transition to the unelected government, hoping to avoid further bloodshed. In the meantime, a non-governmental organization called NCHR-Haiti, an IGH ally and ferocious critic of Neptune’s government, announced that there had been a massacre in La Scierie in which 50 people had been killed.

Journalists who were in St. Marc on February 11 and 12 reported no sign of such a massacre. Louis Joinet, the UN Human Rights Commission’s Independent Expert on Haiti, concluded there was not a massacre, but a fight between two groups. But NCHR-Haiti insisted that the case be prosecuted. The IGH, which had an agreement with NCHR-Haiti to prosecute anyone the organization denounced, obliged by arresting Mr. Neptune along with the former Minister of the Interior, a former member of Parliament and several others.

NCHR-Haiti received a $100,000 grant from the Canadian government (one of the IGH’s three main supporters, along with the U.S. and France) to pursue the La Scierie case. The organization hired a lawyer and former opposition Senator to represent the victims, and kept up the pressure in the press, even denouncing the government for allowing Neptune to receive medical treatment at a UN hospital. This persecution of Neptune went so far that NCHR-Haiti’s parent organization in the U.S. publicly disowned it and requested that it change its name.

In the meantime, Neptune had an adventurous ten months in prison. He survived at least two reported assassination attempts, a December massacre by guards and police in a nearby cellblock, a February prison break in which he was removed from the prison at gunpoint (he turned himself in, again, as soon as he could), and his first hunger strike, which he ended in March after three weeks when he believed he had been promised freedom. He was not brought to court.

The Interim Government keeps Neptune in jail for a case it declines to pursue and cannot prove despite an impressive mobilization of world opinion. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the UN Security Council, the CARICOM countries, human rights groups like Amnesty International, religious leaders and ordinary citizens throughout the world have called on the IGH to let Neptune go to trial or let him go free. Even U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Roger Noriega, one of the regime’s most steadfast foreign supporters, announced as far back as July that the IGH needed to prove its case or drop it.

If the IGH is taking a stand on precarious ground, so is Mr. Neptune. His enormous and dangerous sacrifice has not gained much media attention for him or his cause. If he accepted the offer of exile, he could fight indefinitely from abroad, if he dies he will complete his enemies’ efforts to silence him. Clearing his name is unnecessary- it is obvious that there never was a case against him- but starving to death would not do it.

But Neptune’s hunger strike is not really about clearing his name, it is about clearing everyone off the fences. The Haitian government straddles one fence by locking up its enemies while avoiding the legal consequences of that policy. Hundreds of political prisoners sit in Haiti’s jails, many with a judge’s release order sitting in their files. Next to most of them, Yvon Neptune is fortunate- their detention is just as illegal, probably even more dangerous, and with their lower profiles, they could hunger strike to the bitter end without anyone outside of Haiti caring. Even those prisoners are fortunate, next to the hundreds, if not thousands of others that the Haitian police have executed on the spot in the last year, for demonstrating peacefully, organizing for democracy, or for being young and male in a poor neighborhood. Neptune’s hunger strike is forcing the government to choose, to choose between complying with the law and setting him free or publicly, illegally and terminally depriving him of his rights.

The IGH’s international patrons, especially the U.S., France, Canada, straddle the fence by talking about human rights for Neptune and other Haitians, while avoiding the consequences of their support for the brutal IGH. Those countries, along with the UN, are the government’s principal butresses- they arm and protect the police, fund the government payroll and defend the IGH in the international community. If any of those countries conditioned its continued help on Mr. Neptune’s release (or threatened to bundle the interim President to the Central African Republic), Neptune would be free instantly. Neptune’s strike is showing that these countries cannot simultaneously support their avowed human rights principles and a dictatorial regime, and it is forcing them choose.

The citizens of the U.S., Canada and France are also straddling a fence- we believe in justice and democracy, and in freedom for political prisoners, but we avoid the fact that we are part of the problem. Our governments are supporting the persecution of Yvon Neptune and so many others in our name with our tax dollars, and we are, for the most part, doing very little about it. The hunger strike is forcing us to choose between actively working for Neptune’s liberation or passively paying for his imprisonment.

There are signs of movement along the fence-line. Last weekend’s offer of exile shows that the IGH certainly fears the consequences of Neptune’s death. On Wednesday, the previously silent Human Rights Division of the UN Mission in Haiti declared that “since the beginning of the procedure until today, the fundamental rights, according to national and international standards, have not been respected in the case of Mr. Neptune.” The same day the Organization of American States, which had previously refrained from criticizing the IGH, noted the case’s “serious moral and political implications for the Haitian government and for the international community.”

Neptune has been getting help with his fence-clearing work. Over the last week, a flurry of petitions and action alerts circulated over the internet, and by hand in Haiti, North America and France have spurred hundreds of people to tug their governments towards the side of justice for Yvon Neptune. But hundreds have not been enough- thousands may be needed, and time for Yvon Neptune is running out.

the Times of London uncovered this memo re: justification for war in Iraq
any US journalists see this?

SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY
DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02

cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell

IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER’S MEETING, 23 JULY

Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.

This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.

John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam’s regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime’s record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.

CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.

The two broad US options were:

(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).

(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.

The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:

(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.

(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.

(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun “spikes of activity” to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.

The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.

The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.

On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.

Conclusions:

(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.

(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.

(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.

(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.

He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.

(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.

(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.

(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)

MATTHEW RYCROFT

(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)

citizen x emphasizes this line from the second paragraph:
“Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD.
But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. ”

THE FACTS WERE BEING FIXED.

cut to animation dissolve of YOU turning into a lollipop emblazoned SUCKER